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The Covid-19 – Coronavirus pandemic has rapidly spread around 
the world, demanding for social distancing measures as a strategy 
to soften contagion. Whereas social closeness proves dangerous, 
financial proximity is increasingly needed and can be guaranteed 
by FinTechs or applications, like digital platforms. Networking 
platforms may be represented by bridging nodes like Mobile 
banking (M-banking) hotspots. M-banking and FinTech applications 
are fully consistent with distancing prescriptions and ease financial 
inclusion, allowing for 24/7 operativity. This study proposes  
an innovative interpretation of the networking properties of digital 
platforms and M-banking that represent a new – virtual – 
stakeholder, showing how they improve corporate governance 
interactions. Due to their scalability, platforms foster cooperative 
value co-creating patterns, with deep albeit still under-investigated 
governance implications. Network governance is a novel approach 
to describe the stakeholders‟ ecosystem, and its value-adding 
physical and virtual interactions. The paper shows how to match 
virtual financial proximity with apparently contradicting social 
distancing. This study represents an advance in the literature, as it 
investigates about its smart (digital) extensions that can represent 
a shield against pandemic adversities, reducing transaction costs, 
and information asymmetries. 
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The World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 
2020, has declared the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) 
outbreak a global pandemic (Cucinotta & Vanelli, 
2020). Coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) is  
an infectious disease caused by severe acute 
respiratory syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2).  
It was first identified in December 2019 in Wuhan, 
the capital of China‟s Hubei province, and has since 
spread globally, resulting in an ongoing pandemic. 
The Covid-19 pandemic represents the biggest 
test of the post-crisis financial system to date.  
The global financial system faces the dual challenge 
to sustain the flow of credit amidst declining growth 
and manage heightened risks (FSB, 2020). Central 
banks are expanding their provision of liquidity, as 
they normally do during massive crises. 
In this context, technology has a tool called 
Mobile Banking services (M-banking) for all  
the payment and receipt transactions to maintain 
social distance and stay safe during Covid-19 (Girish 
& Manu, 2020). The pandemic fosters a fast increase 
in digital payments and a sharp rise in mobile app 
adoption. FinTechs are part of this disrupting game. 
The financial sector is constantly striving to find 
new ways to provide financial services to the world‟s 
population as the fact that banks play a key role in 
promoting online businesses. The FinTech industry 
seems to have filled the gap in the inaccessibility of 
financial services, facilitating accessibility for all 
entities to financial tools and services at reasonable 
costs (Boskov, 2019). 
A comprehensive description of the effects of 
the Covid-19 is out of scope in this study. The main 
target, representing the research question, is to 
describe how M-banking (and, more generally, digital 
platforms) can reshape corporate governance 
interactions among physical and virtual stakeholders 
(represented by the platform itself), building up  
a shelter against contagion. 
M-banking applications are part of a more 
comprehensive financial ecosystem that rotates 
around bridging platforms. The links among 
branchless banking nodes can be innovatively 
explained with network theory applied to corporate 
governance concerns. 
The topic investigated in the paper is 
innovative and interdisciplinary and this is  
a consequence of extremely variegated literature 
streams. The current study bridges complementary 
issues to find out undisclosed governance patterns. 
Some peculiar topics that concern the impact  
of Covid-related issues, like social distancing, on 
banking activity, may be extended to more general 
applications. 
The study is structured as follows. Section 2 
contains an interdisciplinary analysis of the 
literature, showing some research gaps. Section 3 is 
dedicated to the methodological assessment, with  
a reformulation of the research question. Section 4 
examines digital platforms and M-banking through 
their networking interaction. M-banking operativity 
and the relationships among its stakeholders are 
examined in Section 5. Section 6 describes  
a bank-branchless society, whereas Section 7 is 
dedicated to the stock market comparison between 
FinTechs and traditional banks. A critical discussion 
(Section 8) precedes some concluding remarks 
(Section 9). 
 
2. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF THE 
LITERATURE 
 
The literature streams that are considered in this 
study are extremely variegated, and, in many 
aspects, they are hardly interrelated. Reference to  
a selection of relevant papers is so preliminary  
to an attempt to identify some possible common 
denominators.  
The topic investigated in the paper is 
innovative and interdisciplinary and this is  
a consequence of extremely variegated literature 
streams. The current study bridges complementary 
issues to find out undisclosed governance patterns 
that concern the impact of Covid-related issues, like 
social distancing, on banking activity.  
The interacting strands of literature examined 
in this study concern M-banking, digital platforms, 
and network governance. Covid-19 literature is not 




M-banking is among the latest in a series of recent 
mobile technological innovations. 
There are many definitions in the literature 
about M-banking. Shaikh and Karjaluoto (2015) 
define M-banking as “A product or service offered by 
a bank or a microfinance institute (bank-led model) 
or MNO (non-bank-led model) for conducting 
financial and non-financial transactions using  
a mobile device, namely a mobile phone, 
smartphone, or tablet” (p. 137). According to the 
findings indicated by these authors in their 
literature review on mobile banking adoption 
“existing research is fragmented, constituted by 
various theoretical frameworks” (Shaikh & 
Karjaluoto, 2015). 
According to these authors, the digital mobile 
ecosystem comprises several applications, channels, 
and methods for conducting M-banking, as well as 
major services offered through M-banking channels.  
Other authors underline that communication 
due to the constant development of mobile 
communication technology can be defined as every 
direct or also indirect monetary transaction made 
with a wireless telecommunication network (Mallat, 
Rossi, & Tuunainen, 2004; Sharma, 2011; Dwivedi, 
Rana, Jeyaraj, Clement, & Williams, 2017; Wu & 
Wang, 2005; Shih, Hung, & Lin, 2010).  
In the same direction, also Fall, Orozco, and 
Akim (2020) point out that M-banking can be 
defined as a platform accessed by mobile phones to 
make payments, transfer funds, make deposits 
(withdrawals are unnecessary), and borrow money 
(overdraft allowed). 
According to these definitions, it is possible to 
consider M-banking as a network based on digital 
platforms (Moro Visconti, 2020b, chapter 3) in which 
several stakeholders (banks, microfinance 
institutions, mobile network operators, and, 
obviously, users) can play interdependence roles.  
Digital innovation changes the financial 
infrastructure and being mobile phone penetration 
strong and steadily increasing, financial service 
providers have made use of mobile money to fill the 
infrastructural gap (McWaters, 2016; Neumann & 
Plückebaum, 2017).  
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2.2. Digital platforms 
 
As shown in Moro Visconti (2020a), digital platforms 
refer to a variety of complementary concepts that 
still need comprehensive systematization in  
the literature. A literature review on digital 
platforms is contained in Asadullah, Faik, and 
Kankanhalli (2018) and in Sutherland and Jarrahi 
(2018) that analyze sharing economy platforms. 
Spagnoletti, Resca, and Lee (2015) define a digital 
platform as “a building block that provides  
an essential function to a technological system  
and serves as a foundation upon which 
complementary products, technologies, or services 
can be developed” (p. 365). A socio-economic 
understanding of the “information society” is 
provided in Miller (2020). 
Digital platforms are multisided digital 
frameworks that shape the terms on which 
participants interact. Digital platforms are also 
complex mixtures of software, hardware, operations, 
and networks (de Reuven, Sørensen, & Basole, 2018; 
Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; Gawer, 2014). They 
provide a set of shared techniques, technologies, 
and interfaces to a broad set of users; social and 
economic interactions are mediated online, often by 
apps (Kenney & Zysman, 2016). Business ecosystems 
can be improved by 24/7 platforms (Hyysalo, 
Kelanti, Sauvola, Liukkunen, & Sauvola, 2019). 
 
2.3. From network theory to networked governance 
 
Network theory (Bapat, 2011; Barabási, 2016; 
Caldarelli & Catanzaro, 2011; Erdős & Rényi, 1959; 
Estrada & Knight, 2015; Jackson, 2008; Van Steen, 
2010) is the study of graphs as a representation of 
either symmetric or asymmetric relations between 
discrete objects. In computer science and network 
science, network theory is a part of graph theory:  
a network can be defined as a graph in which nodes 
and/or edges have attributes (e.g., names).  
An interdependent network is a system of coupled 
networks where nodes of one or more networks 
depend on nodes in other networks. 
Networked (corporate) governance originates 
from the interactivity of network theory with 
corporate governance principles. The topic has  
been illustrated in Fenwick, McCahery, and 
Vermeulen (2019) and Moro Visconti (2019) but, 
according to the authors, this connection is still 
under-investigated, showing a literature gap. 
On the contrary, several economic models have 
been developed in the literature to explain how  
the diffusion of technologies takes place. Among 
them, technology adoption models with network 
externalities have been well studied (David, 1985; 
Farrell & Saloner, 1985; Katz & Shapiro, 1986), 
especially for the adoption of competing 
technologies, pointing out that technology is 
characterized by network externalities that occur 
when the benefit that an agent can obtain from his 
adhesion to a network is positively correlated to  
the number of members connected to the same 
network – besides the adoption models with 
“network externalities”, other models consist of the 
so-called “equilibrium” models (Battisti & Stoneman, 
2003; David, 1991; Karshenas & Stoneman, 1993),  
or the “epidemic” models (Mansfield, 1961) – as 




The methodology of the study follows an IMRAD 
structure (Wu, 2011). 
The literature survey illustrated in Section 2,  
as well as the literature survey, represents  
a methodological prerequisite for the study.  
The results are described in Section 4 (From 
networked digital platforms and M-banking 
networks), Section 5 (M-banking operativity), and 
Section 6 (Towards a bank branchless society?). 
The discussion contains some critical remarks, 
whereas the conclusion synthesizes the main issues, 
and gives tips for further research. 
As anticipated in the introduction, the research 
question is the following: 
 to describe how M-banking (and, more 
generally, digital platforms) can reshape corporate 
governance interactions among physical and virtual 
stakeholders (represented by the platform itself), 
building up a shelter against contagion; 
 to understand the impact of bank 
desertification, due to the decrease of “physical” 
bank branches. 
The research question can be synthesized in 
the following graphical representation (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. From network theory to digital platforms and networks of networks 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
4. FROM NETWORKED DIGITAL PLATFORMS TO  
M-BANKING BRIDGING NODES 
 
The main consideration behind this study is that 
traditional banking activity, performed through 
“physical” branches, eases social proximity, and may 
favor the spreading of viruses. The interaction of  
M-banking with complementary digital platforms 
and FinTechs substantially improves the situation. 
An example is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. From traditional to digital bank-client relationships 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
A compared analysis of the two networks 
shows at first sight that digital platforms, operating 
under M-banking and FinTech applications, 
reengineer the traditional bank-client relationship, 
making social distancing possible. 
The added value of a digital ecosystem may be 
estimated using a with-or-without methodology 
(consistently with the International Valuation 
Standard 210 (IVSC, 2016, § 80.1)), by comparing 
two scenarios: one in which the business uses the 
subject intangible asset (here represented by the 
digital platform/M-banking device) and one in which  
the business does not use the subject intangible 
asset (but all other factors are kept constant). 
M-banking allows traditional banks to become 
internet-only (web) banks, with a switching  
value that is perceived by the clients (Su-Ji &  
Chae-Bogk, 2018). 
 
5. M-BANKING OPERATIVITY 
 
M-banking operativity can be examined considering 
the collaborative relationships of stakeholders like 
banks, mobile network operators, and microfinance 
institutions that shape their corporate governance 
patterns and the advantages of M-banking users. 
 
5.1. Relationships between banks, mobile network 
operators, and microfinance institutions 
 
Mobile money is a technological instrument  
that enables customers to use mobile phones for 
financial services, referring to the entire range  
of mobile-money-enabled financial products.  
Mobile payment systems require multi-institutional 
cooperation and interplay between different 
regulators.  
Mobile banking is the fastest-growing channel 
of banking as a result few people are walking into 
bank branches nowadays. Banks now need to remain 
relevant by catering to the needs and expectations of 
the customers and the technology advancements, 
providing better services and products that 
customers can utilize. The role of IT in the banking 
sector can be divided into two categories: 
Communication and connectivity, and individual and 
business transactions. IT enables sophisticated 
products to be developed with better frameworks, 
execution of dependable strategies, and help with 
communication to connect with people from 
different countries, businesses across the globe, 
geographical distance, and diverse markets (Cavus & 
Christina, 2016).  
The player who dominates this relationship will 
tend to determine the kind of business model  
that emerges:  
1) At one extreme, the mobile network 
operator can dominate or own the whole value 
chain. The resulting business model may be open to 
more banking institutions but will almost certainly 
exclude other network operators.  
2) On the opposite side, when the banking 
institution dominates, the resulting model tends to 
be more open to other network operators, but less 
for banking institutions.  
3) The middle ground might involve  
a partnership of almost equal responsibility by both 
partners and even an independent third part. 
These interrelations have important corporate 
governance consequences on the composite 
stakeholders that rotate around the M-banking 
ecosystem. 
A well-designed mobile payments solution has 
the potential to benefit all interested stakeholders: 
network mobile operators will increase traffic on 
their networks and hence profits from usage fees; 
banking institutions may get the opportunity to 
service a larger population, many of whom were 
unreachable before because of the costs of serving 
them exceed expected return on investment. 
It is possible also to point out the usefulness of 
M-banking services for banking and microfinance 
clients that are complementary between the banking 
and microfinance services, on one part, and  
the M-banking services, on the other. This result is 
also observed because of the greater maturity of 
customers of the banking system, compared with 
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a better understanding of M-banking services 
because their financial knowledge is higher than that 
of others, which explains their greater propensity to 
adopt the technology to bridge the gap between 
rural development and financial inclusion (Agwu, 
2020; Wieser, Bruhn, Kinzinger, Ruckteschler, & 
Heitmann, 2019).  
Greater integration of M-banking from banks 
and microfinance institutions is recommended (Fall 
et al., 2020). As Kumar, McKay, and Rotman Parker 
(2010) argue, the integration of M-banking by 
microfinance institutions can enable them to reach 
new geographical areas and improve the service they 
provide. It is necessary also to consider  
the importance to encourage the promotion of 
financial education, to induce greater adoption  
of M-banking services. Financial education can lead 
individuals to make greater use of M-banking 
through a better understanding of this kind of 
technology and its usefulness. 
Since the rise of the mobile money market in 
2007, if we consider for instance the African market, 
it is possible to notice that mobile network 
operators (MNOs) are still dominant, although 
FinTechs and some banks are gaining power. 
Consequently, in these countries most mobile 
services were and now are offered as a partnership 
between a dominating MNO cooperating with a bank 
as the holder of funds and customer accounts. 
Chironga, De Grandis, and Zouaoui (2017) 
emphasize that mobile money providers managed to 
take advantage by offering superior customer 
service: mobile money services are easy to access 
and they can offer transactions and even more 
advanced financial services with less effort, 
requirements, and transaction costs compared to 
conventional banks. Besides, MNOs can profit from 
network effects and economies of scale. Transaction 
costs have important agency and governance 
consequences (Nguena, 2019). 
There are examples in African countries of 
mobile money that can create further opportunities 
that range from integrated, cross-MNO, and  
cross-border transactions via compatibility with 
service providers of worldwide cash transfers. 
Market integration is fostered by mobile money as it 
facilitates transfers and payments across different 
MNO operators and borders.  
The market has become more connected as 
cooperation between MNOs emerged throughout 
Africa, with the effect to increase interoperability 
between different providers. One example of this is 
the joint venture between MTN and Orange, called 
Mowali (mobile wallet interoperability), which was 
announced in November of 2018 (Orange, 2018). 
Furthermore, both market leaders (M-Pesa in Kenya 
and MTN in South Africa) signed an agreement in 
2018 to ensure the compatibility of transactions 
between the systems in 19 countries (Disse & 
Sommer, 2020). 
Mobile money is also compatible with 
international cash transfer systems: some MNOs are 
expanding their system through cooperation with 
internationally operating cash transfer systems 
(Western Union, for example, or PayPal) to enable 
customers to move funds between the different 
accounts for a modest fee, which holds promising 
potential for remittance flows.  
Traditionally, until recently, the mobile 
telecommunication industry and financial industry 
have been completely separated, each with  
a different, clearly defined sector and market. 
Nowadays, however, mobile technologies have 
become more and more sophisticated, and new 
forms of payment have become a hot topic. Near 
Field Communication (NFC) mobile payment is  
a phenomenon that enables users to convert their 
smartphones into digital wallets. Before, paying in 
stores came down to using cash or cards, whereas 
modern payment methods enable customers to pay 
using their mobile phones with the help of  
NFC technology. This recent development of NFC 
technology enabled the emergence of services for 
mobile phone payments (Pham & Ho, 2015). 
Consequently, there is a growingly intensive 
collaboration between MNOs and banks, to offer new 
products and new kinds of payment services (Tomìc 
& Stojanovic, 2018). 
Mobile money technology allows users to 
conduct financial operations through mobile 
networks where cash-in cash-out services are 
provided by small business outlets better known as 
agents. The mobile money account can, therefore,  
be accessed without having an account at a financial 
institution but mobile money users who already 
possess a bank account can connect both accounts.  
If there are challenges for financial institutions 
to compete with FinTech firms, there are also 
opportunities for collaboration. A recent and 
growing literature is starting to observe just  
the cooperation between banks and FinTech firm, 
that may entail several benefits: for banks, this 
partnership may give them the possibility to develop 
new customer segments, products, services,  
and new capabilities too; in return, FinTechs may 
benefit from bank reputation and also from a new 
source of finance and infrastructure (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017). 
 
5.2. M-banking users’ advantages 
 
The rapid growth and adoption rate of mobile 
phones in developed and, overall, in developing 
countries, has resulted in an exponential increase  
in mobile services (Donner, 2008; Suri & Jack, 2016). 
The wide use of mobile phones is increasing  
low-income households‟ access to a large range of 
services and one of these services is M-banking 
(Moro Visconti & Quirici, 2014; Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2018). 
Mobile financial services embody all of  
the opportunities given for digitalization: they have 
far lower transaction costs at every stage of the 
process, allow for better screening and credit 
assessment, allow lowering risk and default, remove 
collateral requirements, overcome high costs for 
financial services including application processes, 
and increase customer convenience and simplify 
service provision (Disse & Sommer, 2020). 
Consequently, digital innovations, and mobile 
money, gives a new impetus to the banking sector to 
improve its relationship with customers and 
increase performance (World Bank Group, 2019). 
Progress in mobile devices development,  
and a synergy of three components – mobile devices, 
telecommunication networks, and financial 
services – have led to a growing number of  
M-banking users (Liébana-Cabanillas, Marinković, & 
Kalinić, 2017). This growing trend enables banks to 
distribute their services cheaper and timelier to 
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clients. Potential security deficiencies in M-banking 
have been minimized and come down to users‟ 
errors. Almost all M-banking applications use a PIN 
code when initializing; it is created by the user and it 
is necessary for making transactions via mobile 
devices, which improves the security of M-banking 
(Tomic & Stojanovic, 2018). 
Considering in particular the developing 
countries, the mobile financial technology, that is 
virtually accessible to anyone with a mobile phone, 
holds the promise to leapfrog the provision of 
banking services thanks to the comparatively high 
penetration of mobile phones in contrast to the low 
density of banking infrastructure. It allows banks  
to leverage innovative and less costly business 
models to serve unbanked or underbanked people 
by overcoming existing market inefficiencies and 
reducing the prohibitive cost of maintaining  
physical bank branches in rural locations (Sharma & 
Al-Muharrami, 2018).  
Evidence suggests that mobile phones are 
creating new income opportunities for the 
marginalized social segments in developing 
countries and SMEs (Donner, 2008; Esselaar, Stork, 
Ndiwalana, & Deen-Swarray, 2007). The actual 
unprecedented usage of mobile phones creates  
an opportunity for the massive population who own 
a mobile phone but no bank account to be connected 
to the financial system. In other terms, mobile 
payments can be leveraged to bring-in many people 
that are outside of the traditional banking system.  
In this way, the mobile network gets an opportunity 
to include more people marginalized by current  
non-cash solutions, helping more economic activity 
and hopefully positive development.  
In all the technology adoption models with 
network externalities, users are heterogeneous, with 
different preferences for innovation, and they 
simultaneously decide whether to adopt or switch to 
new technology or not. In these users‟ perspective, 
M-banking can have network effects that could be 
considered a complementary service to exchange 
money or to transfer money to other members of 
their network, such as family members or business 
partners, who do not have a bank account. Having 
an M-banking account, all individuals with a regular 
bank account can access a new network of 
relationships. Notably, even passive users benefit 
from M-banking because they can take advantage of 
promotions (from the mobile operator) or transfer 
and receive funds with other people in the same 
network at a very low cost (Jack & Suri, 2014).  
They can also receive micro-transfers of phone 
credits from family or friends belonging to the same 
M-banking network.  
The use of technology to provide new and 
improved financial services is consistent with 
FinTech business models. M-banking allows users to 
access these services at lower costs (Ky, 
Rugemintwari, & Sauviat, 2019), also correcting 
information asymmetries in the market and 
eliminating unnecessary transportation as well as 
transaction costs. But cash payments are still  
the predominant means of settling transactions. 
Financial tools like cheques, debit cards, and 
electronic payment transactions are still in  
the provenience of big companies, government 
departments, and well-off individuals (Ashta &  
Biot-Paquerot, 2018).  
Therefore, it is possible to point out that over 
the last decade, mobile payments, and M-banking  
in particular, have been disrupting traditional 
financial services and transforming the lives of 
hundreds of millions of people across developing 
countries, representing a key of financial inclusion 
(Lashitew, van Tulder, & Liasse, 2019; GSMA, 2019; 
Ozili, 2020; Hendriks, 2019; Chatterjee, 2020) and  
a prerequisite for successful mobile commerce in 
these countries too. This trend bears important 
governance implications. 
M-banking can soften many financial 
bottlenecks, even related to pandemics, as 
exemplified in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Impact of M-banking 
 
Issue/Bottleneck M-banking impact/solution 
Liquidity shock M-banking provides immediate cash. 
Distance from ATM or bank branch M-banking eliminates physical distances. 
Security Digital money is cheaper to store, and more difficult to steal 
Social distancing Virtual transactions are contact-free 
 
There are, however, some disadvantages, 
connected, for instance, to cyber-crimes and phishing.  
 
6. TOWARDS A BANK-BRANCHLESS SOCIETY 
 
Another bottleneck of the financial system is 
connected to the bank desertification issue. Physical 
branching is fading, and – wherever still present – is 
becoming increasingly expensive, so preventing or 
reducing financial inclusion. Consequences on weak 
and unbanked stakeholders, especially elderly and 
low-income people, are gloomy. 
Since the financial crisis of 2008 ignited by  
the Lehman Brothers default, bank profitability has 
fallen significantly, only starting to recover in  
recent years but in most cases not reaching  
pre-crisis levels (Borroni & Rossi, 2019). The 
phenomenon is particularly evident in Europe, where 
regulators (European Central Bank – ECB and 
European Banking Authority – EBA) have for some 
years now stressed the need for banks to implement 
a series of activities aimed at increasing a lasting 
ability to generate profits. Banks have adopted two 
main approaches to achieve this objective:  
a significant reduction in non-performing loans 
(NPLs) and a progressive improvement in cost 
efficiency. Nonetheless, at the time of the outbreak 
of the Covid-19 pandemic, European banks still had 
somewhat modest levels of profitability (average 
ROE of 5.9% at the end of 2019), well below those of 
US banks (9.5%) at the same date (EBA, 2020).  
Almost certainly, in the period following the 
epidemic, the prospects for bank profitability will 
undergo further compression, due to both the 
economic recession deriving from the epidemic itself 
(with a resulting increase in non-performing loans), 
and to the continuation of a more generous 
monetary policy, necessary to deal with the impact 
of the recession. A recent estimate by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), based on a group 
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of nine advanced economies, shows that most of  
the banking sectors examined may not be able to 
generate sufficient profits to cover their cost of 
equity (IMF, 2020). 
The aftermath of the pandemic could have  
a further negative consequence: many banks may  
be induced to delay the implementation of plans  
to reduce their operating costs given that 
organizational choices such as branch closures  
and staff reductions could generate reputational 
concerns as to the soundness of the banks 
themselves. 
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that  
the process of a progressive reduction in physical 
branches, which is now typical of all banking 
systems in economically developed countries, will 
continue over time. Although the timing of starting 
point has differed, as has the speed of 
implementation, for a decade now there has been an 
increasingly marked downsizing of traditional 
“bricks & mortar” networks, including in countries 
where, at least until the early 2000s, a steady 
increase in the number of bank branches had 
occurred (Figure 3). The differences can be explained 
by a variety of reasons including countries‟ 
digitalization rates, the existence of many local 
banks, the geographical aspects of areas served, and 
the characteristics of different economic and  
socio-demographic systems (Borroni & Rossi, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 3. Commercial bank branches (per 100,000 adults) – selected countries (*) 
 
 
Note: (*) Austria (AUT), Belgium (BEL), Central Europe and the Baltics (CEB), Switzerland (CH), Germany (DEU), Spain (ESP), European 
Union (EU), Finland (FIN), France (FRA), United Kingdom (GBR), Italy (ITA), Japan (JPN), Netherlands (NLD), United States (USA). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on World Bank Data (World Bank, 2020a). 
 
However, it is undoubtedly true that the „social‟ 
consequences of Covid-19 (precautionary 
quarantining, social distancing) have generated a 
strong incentive for the use of online services by 
banking customers, including those previously 
accustomed to going to their branch. Even those 
banks most reluctant to reduce their branch 
networks could be induced to increase investments 
in online banking, thanks in part to the European 
Commission‟s recent proposal to bring forward  
the non-deduction of prudently valued software 
assets (EC, 2020). This could generate some 
important repercussions. Firstly, a profound revision 
of the branch-centered distribution model: customer 
relations, both in-person and online, will continue to 
be managed by branches, supported by dedicated 
customer contact centers, especially for specialized 
activities, but bricks and mortar branch contact will 
play a secondary role compared to online services 
(Stewart, Soussan, Roussel, Dupas, Uribe, & Brugère, 
2019). As a result, the traditional branch will 
undergo an important transformation in its 
customary format as regards working hours (evening 
and weekend service, 24/7 online-only branches), 
location (mobile branch vehicles), and relations 
(partnerships with retailers for the sale of highly 
standardized products/services).  
In this evolutionary process, an important role 
will be played by FinTech. Too often, bank 
investments have been focused on front-end 
aspects, i.e., on graphic interfaces, and not on the 
improvement of underlying operational (back-end) 
systems indispensable for improving and 
personalizing the customer experience, in real-time 
and based on data, an activity that represents the 
core business of BigTech and FinTech (Capgemini & 
EFMA, 2020). Among other things, as already 
mentioned above, this would favor an increase in  
the degree of financial inclusion of multiple subjects 
(people and businesses, especially small ones)  
who live in economically underdeveloped areas: 
according to the plan launched a few years ago by 
the World Bank (Universal Financial Access – UFA 
2020), access to basic financial services in digital 
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form could make it possible to avoid the need for 
physical bank branches, increase opportunities  
for economic growth, and reduce the degree of 
relative poverty in many countries. Indeed, it  
should not be forgotten that despite progress made 
in the last decade, almost a third of adults 
worldwide are still without a basic transaction 
account (Demirgüç-Kunt, Klapper, Singer, Ansar, & 
Hess, 2020). 
The main tool driving this process, in terms 
both of evolution in developed countries and of 
growing financial inclusion, is represented by the 
mobile phone, through which multiple – and 
certainly the most used – banking services can be 
ensured. The choice of this device is consistent with 
its rapid spread over the last few years: even in 
economically less developed countries, characterized 
by economic fragility and widespread poverty, 
mobile phones are now available to large sections of 
the population, including in particularly difficult 
geographical contexts (mountains, desert areas, etc.), 
as testified by the data in Figure 4. 
 







Note: (*) Mobile-phone subscriptions are subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service that provides access to the PSTN using 
cellular technology. Left panel – heavily indebted poor countries (HPC), Low-income countries (LIC), OECD members (OED), World (WLD), 
Fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS). Right panel – geographical areas (excluding high-income countries): East Asia & Pacific (EAP), 
Europe & Central Asia (ECA), Latin America & Caribbean (LAC), Middle East & North Africa (MNA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on World Bank Data (World Bank, 2020b). 
 
A second positive aspect of this technological 
transformation could be avoidance, at least in part, 
of the creation of so-called banking „deserts‟, i.e., 
areas where access to bank branches is impossible. 
This phenomenon, usually typical of economically 
underdeveloped countries, is also assuming growing 
importance in the USA, following the financial crisis 
of the last decade (Kashian, Tao, & Drago, 2018; 
Hegerty, 2020; Mende, Salisbury, Nenkov, & Scott, 
2020), causing concerns among the control 
authorities (FDIC, 2018; Tranfaglia, 2018) because 
the poorest and most vulnerable minorities are 
concentrated in these areas, often already 
marginalized due to other socio-economic factors 
(level of education, unemployment rate, etc.). Even in 
Europe, similar phenomena of „financial 
desertification‟ have already been observed, albeit 
for the moment only in rural contexts or in areas 
inhabited predominantly by older people 
(Burgstaller, 2017; Hasan, Jackowicz, Kowalewski, & 
Kozlowski, 2019). Although the presence of 
branches remains very important in certain 
customer relationships (especially with small and 
medium-sized enterprises, in terms of soft 
information, difficult to process by algorithms),  
the use of M-banking could, therefore, help to 
overcome the absence of physical points of contact 
with the bank, ensuring the availability of essential 
banking services and, after the further development 
of technology, also of services with a higher level of 
customization. Mobile money technology acceptance 
represents a further issue to consider (Gbongli & 
Amedjonekou, 2019). 
 
7. FINTECHS VERSUS TRADITIONAL BANKS. 
EVIDENCE FROM THE STOCK MARKET DURING 
THE PANDEMICS 
 
The reaction of the stock market to the pandemics 
provides further useful insights to detect the current 
mega-trends, and their likelihood to change forever 
the competitive landscape. This occurs also in the 
financial intermediation industry. 
FinTechs are behaving very differently from 
traditional banks (Moro Visconti, 2020d), and they 
appear more reactive to stock market fluctuations. 
Even though FinTechs have composite business 
models (including InsurTech, PropTech, SupTech, 
RegTech, etc., as shown in Moro Visconti, 2020c), 
they may represent a good proxy for mobile banking 
applications, so showing which is the market mood. 
Data from Bloomberg covering the first 
semester of 2020 compare a sample of FinTechs 
from the IFINXNT – Index Global Fintech Thematic 
Index with the MXW00BK – MSCI World Banks 
Weighted Equity Index. Stock prices are reported in 
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Figure 5. Stock market prices of a FinTech Index 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg (2020). 
 
Figure 6. Stock market prices of a banking index 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg (2020). 
 
A compared analysis of the two graphs 
indicates that, after a collapse of both indices in  
the second half of February 2020 – the first half of 
March, FinTechs have recovered, whereas banks are 
still consistently below their pre-Covid prices. This is 
due to several reasons, such as:  
 The resilience of FinTech business models 
that are digitalized, so favoring social distance. 
 The very fact that banks (and their stock 
market perspectives) are affected by the gloomy 
forecast of the Covid-driven recession, with an 
impact on their clients and a worsening of the 
lending portfolio. 
 The fact that most banks, unlike FinTechs, 
own Treasury Bonds/bills and other investments 
that may incorporate higher default risk. 
These differences bear important governance 
consequences. For instance, whenever stock prices 
increase (or bounce back to pre-crisis levels, as it 
happens for FinTechs), they reduce the cost of 
capital and the conflicts of interest among 
composite stakeholders. And listed stocks represent 
a benchmark for promising startups before an IPO. 
 
 
8.  DISCUSSION 
 
A discussion of the main findings of this study is 
preliminary to some concluding remarks. The main 
points may be represented by the corporate 
governance implications of digital platforms and  
the regulatory consequences. 
Corporate governance relationships among  
the stakeholders are reshaped by the presence of 
digital platforms that represent a digital stakeholder 
and a bridging node among other more conventional 
players. 
Digital platforms normally convey traffic of 
data and transactions. (Big) data soften information 
asymmetries that represent the main governance 
concern. 
Transactions are possible whenever platforms 
act as an e-commerce intermediating hub or – in our 
case – when they are linked to M-banking apps, 
increasingly powered by FinTech solutions. 
The digital scalability and resilience of 
platforms can be enhanced by artificial intelligence 
interpretation of big data (typically stored in the 
cloud) and validated by blockchains. 
The development of M-banking presents two 
critical issues from a regulatory point of view: first 
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of all, it is necessary to strengthen safeguards for 
the protection of users of financial services 
accessible through online channels (cyber-attacks, 
misleading news, misleading behavior by producers, 
etc.). Many mobile phone owners are financially  
“at-risk”, due to a somewhat limited, if not 
completely absent, awareness of the operating 
mechanisms of even the simplest financial services 
(World Bank, 2017). Ease of use of services could 
lead to an underestimation of the legal and financial 
problems associated with certain transactions, for 
example, the possibility of using forms of credit for 
purchases, and the growing level of debt that 
characterizes the weaker sections of the population. 
Secondly, the development and diffusion of 
FinTechs offering financial services like those 
offered by banks can generate confusion among 
users, leading them to equate these services with 
those traditionally provided by banks. However,  
it should be borne in mind that while credit 
institutions are subject to strict regulation and 
supervision, FinTechs operate in a much „softer‟ 
regulatory environment but also enjoy a very 
limited, if not completely absent, level of protection 
if problematic situations arise. The recent 
bankruptcy of Wirecard, a German FinTech 
specializing in the provision of electronic payment 
services, has underlined the issue of the possible 
consequences of a business crisis in the segment of 
online financial service providers. The Expert Group 
on Regulatory Obstacles to Financial Innovation  
has recently moved in this direction, commissioned 
by the European Commission to outline a framework 
for technology-enabled provisions of financial 
services in the European Union. The approach 
adopted does not provide for specific provisions  
for individual financial services, but contains some 
important recommendations to ensure that 
alongside healthy sector competitiveness, adequate 
safeguards for consumers and businesses are 
guaranteed, with appropriate mitigation of  
the risks normally associated with these services 
(EC, 2019). 
M-banking is still part of a highly supervised 
financial industry, even to avoid the risk of 
circumventive innovation, bypassing somewhat  
old-fashioned rules. Even in the FinTech industry, 
RegTech and SupTech are emerging as two 
innovative businesses, concerning the technological 
aspects of regulation. 
The governance implications of supervision are 
well known and documented. Banks are profoundly 
different from nonfinancial firms and there are at 
least three features that make them special: 
1) regulation; 2) the capital structure (including  
the supervisory capital), 3) the complexity and 
opacity of their business and structure (de Haan & 
Vlahu, 2015).  
Sound bank-corporate governance is a crucial 
element for promoting a more resilient financial 
system and sustaining economic growth (Brogi & 
Lagasio, 2018). 
If we consider the role of mobile payments and 
M-banking in a vital financial services network,  
we have also to underline that there are much 
necessary policy and regulatory implications. If this 
network must work successfully, multiple 
stakeholders with varying interests need to work 
together. These may include banking institutions, 
telecommunications operators, payment processors, 
regulatory agencies, government departments,  
the private sector, and so on. Consequently, there is  
a need for high-level guidance in the form of  
a national strategy within which various players may 
interact to offer truly transformational payment 
systems. Besides, the myriad of laws and regulations 
that relate to financial institutions, on one-hand, and 
telecommunications operators, on the other, had to 
be scrutinized and synchronized to enable  
a successful implementation of mobile phone 
payments within the context of the country. 
There is the opportunity to look beyond all  
the potential problems that may arise and instead 
focus on the potential that can be generated by this 
kind of network. Besides harmonizing their 
activities, regulators need to build up their 
institutional capacity to be able to keep pace with 
social, technological, and economic changes. 
Many of the current business models, 
dominated by either network operators or banking 
institutions, tend to lock out the competition. Open 
business models are needed to accommodate 
multiple stakeholders, creating a nationwide 
solution. Beyond the regulatory hurdles, the 
diversity of stakeholders (telecommunication 
platforms, interfaces) is yet another challenge, that 
may necessitate third party institutions (Ndiwalana 
& Popov, 2016). 
Successful mobile payments have the potential 
to revolutionize payment systems, above all in 
developing countries, transforming how small 
businesses operate and, also, providing services for 
the financial needs of many poor people in distant 
rural areas more economically where there aren‟t 
bank branches. With a successful mobile payments 
model, there can be a breeding ground for more 
innovative mobile phone applications that can 
respond to the needs of small businesses. For 
example, many small businesses have problems 
accessing credit partly due to poor record-keeping. 
Mobile payments can generate a trail of transactions 
that may be used to create appropriate business 
records (Ndiwalana & Popov, 2016). 
There is a need to experiment with different 
business models that create an enabling regulatory 
environment to accommodate multiple players, even 
competitors from the same industry. 
In many developing countries the 
telecommunications sector is growing rapidly thanks 
to increasing liberalization. The cost of owning  
a mobile phone and accessing services is falling due 
to increased competition among the growing 
number of operators.  
Many governments, having noticed the 
potential of the mobile phone explosion, 
unfortunately, react by increasing taxes on mobile 
services, since operators provide an easy avenue to 
collect such taxes. So, while operator competition is 
driving prices down, taxation increases service costs, 
limiting the potential positive impact that M-banking 
can have in connecting people. For this reason, it is 
time that all stakeholders ignore their own interests 
and work together to make this a win-win reality.  
 
9.  CONCLUSION 
 
Covid-like pandemics deeply reshape the 
relationships among interacting stakeholders, with 
long-term effects that may survive the emergency. 
The adverse effects of pandemics are many, even 
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from a socio-economic perspective. They may, for 
instance, exacerbate financial exclusion, especially 
for the underserved poor. M-banking emerges as  
an aseptic application that can foster economic 
inclusion, preserving social distance protocols. 
Digital platforms emerge as a key virtual 
stakeholder, due to their bridging properties and 
networking attitudes that may foster financial 
inclusion, widening the financial ecosystem, and 
making it more resilient to external shocks like  
the Covid-19 pandemics. 
New financial intermediaries, like FinTechs  
or BigTech firms, complement the business activity  
of traditional banks that still rely on  
resource-absorbing physical branching. 
This study has shown that these digital 
interactions, mastered by networking platforms, 
deeply reshape the relationships among the 
composite stakeholders (unbanked or underbanked 
clients, traditional bank clients, financial 
intermediaries, etc.) that populate the financial 
intermediation ecosystem. These innovative insights 
are part of network governance (Moro Visconti, 
2019), a new literature strand that reinterprets  
the corporate governance relationships among 
traditional stakeholders considering their 
networking interactions, and the mediating role of 
virtual platforms – an emerging virtual stakeholder 
that adds value to the whole ecosystem. The main 
theoretical contribution of the study is represented 
by an application of an innovative approach, 
network governance, to a vital issue represented by 
financial exclusion. 
The main limitations of the study concern  
a still missing empirical evidence of some trendy 
issues, as the function of bridging platforms, and 
their economic impact in terms of transactional 
savings in a difficult context where financial 
exclusion represents a core capital rationing 
concern. Subsequent references to supply and value 
chains populated by value co-creating stakeholders, 
and re-engineered around the digital platforms,  
also deserve further scrutiny, and may represent  
a tip for new literature advances. Since platforms 
mainly intermediate online transactions and (big) 
data exchanges, they are intrinsically fit for  
reducing information asymmetries, and consequent 
conflicts of interest; this represents a further  
under-investigated issue. 
An extension of the network governance 
principles to other trendy fields of investigation may 
be recommended to visionary corporate governance 
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